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I. Basic Liabilities 
A. Section 3-40 5 codifies and adds to sec�ion 9(3) of 
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law. It provides for a 
series of cases in which an indorsement "in the name of a 
named payee'' is effective even though that indorsemen t is 
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made by some person other than the named payee. But for the 
application of 3-405, such an indorsement would be a forgery, 
would prevent subsequent takers from being holders or holders 
in due course and would cause each subsequent transferee to 
breach his warranty of good title. The consequence of 3-40S's 
application is that the indorsement is good, subsequent parties 
have "good title, " and so can enforce the instrument against 
the drawer notwithstanding the forgery. Section 3-405 reads 
in full as follows: 
§ 3-405. Impostors; Signature in Name of Payee 
(l) An indorsement by any person in the name of 
a named payee is effective if 
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or other­
wise has induced the maker or drawer to 
issue the instrument to him or his confed­
erate in the name of the payee; or 
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a 
maker or drawer intends the payee to have 
no interest in the instrument� or 
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or 
drawer has supplied him with the name 
of the payee intending the latter to have 
no such interest. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the 
criminal or civil liability of the person so indorsing. 
B. Subsection l (a) deals with the standard case in �ich 
one person poses as another. A recent application of subsection 
a. occurred when a crooked insurance agent posed as the insured 




f �i 1 �. 





c. Subsection l (b) deals with the case in which the 
drawer or a person with actual authority in the drawer's organi' 
zation to draw, makes a check to one whom he intends to have no; 
interest in the instrument. An example would be the case of a 
corporate treasurer who chose to draw a check to a fictitious 
payee and then to cash it. 
D. Subsection l (c) adds the prior law and is the 
frequently invoked subsection in 3-405. It covers the 
padded payroll or padded accounts payable situation in which 
the payroll clerk adds the name to the payroll, snatches the 
check on the way back through the payment process and cashes 
it. 
E. The recent cases and the issues that they present. 
l. Agency or not? According to the cases and the 
comments, subsection l (a) does not encompass the case 
in which a party represents himself to be the agent of 
some third party and causes the check to be issued in the 
name of that third party. Comment 2 to 3-405 puts it as 
follows: 
"Impostor 11 refers to impersonation and does 
not extend to a false representation that 
the party is the authorized agent of the 
payee. A maker or drawer who takes the pre­
caution of making the instrument payable 
to the principal is entitled to have his 
indorsement. 
For example, in Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. 
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 508 
(N. Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) an accountant posing as the agent 
of two parties caused stock to be sold by a stock brokerag 
The broker then sent his check in the name of the putative 
principals to the thief who forged their indorsements and ( 
cashed them. The court held that section 3-405 did not 
apply since the accountant had simply misrepresented his 
agency and had not posed as the named payees. Compare 
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust Co. , 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1142 (N. Y. Civ. Ct. 
1970) � in the Manu£actu�ers case Loretta owned a savings 
account in a Savings and Loan Association. Either her 
former husband Wolfgang or her former husband's new wife 
appeared, presented a forged withdrawal order to the 
Savings and Loan Association and so caused a check to be 
drawn to Loretta's order. Either Wolfgang or his new 









The drawer Savings and Loan argued that at least if Wolf­
gang was the one who had presented the withdrawal orders, 
there was no imposture, but only a misrepresentation of 
agency for Loretta to withdraw the money and thus that 3-40 5 
would not apply. The court concluded that Wolfgang did 
not simply misrepresent his agency but that he in fact 
used the wi thdrawal orders to "pretend to be Loretta." 
The case seems questionable, most difficult to distinguish 
from the Chemical Bank case. See also East Gadsden v. 
First City National Bank of Gadsden, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 275, 
281 So. 2d 431 (Ala. Ct. of App. 1973) • 
2. The existence of a real person or a real debt. 
Under the pre-Code law it was sometimes argued that 
if the named payee was not wholly fictitious, but was in 
fact the name of a real person, the doctrine did not 
apply. The section rejects that argument and states 
in Comment 1 that "the existence or non-existence of 
the named payee is not dec isive. " 
One cannot say the same for the existence or non­
existence of a legitimate claim under the l(c) cases. 
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. First Pennsylvania Bank 
and Trust Co. v. Neufeld , 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1169 (3d Cir. 
1971) a crooked stockbroker periodically sold stocks from 
the accounts of his customers, caused checks made payable 
to their order to be drawn and then stole the checks and 
forged the indorsements. The drawee bank argued that 
3-405(1) (c) applied on the theory that the stockbroker 
·had supplied the drawer with the names of the payees and 
with the intent that they had no interest in the ultimate 
checks. The court accepted that argument. It rejected 
the argument that the customers were bona fide creditors 
and distinguished the Snug Harbor case discussed below on 
the ground that in Snug Harbor the payees were actual 
creditors. In Snug Harbor Realty Co. v. First National 
Bank of Toms River, N. J. , 2 53 A.2d 545, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 
6 89 (N. J. 1969) one Magee initialed valid invoices and for­
warded them to Snug Harbor's bookkeeper. The bookkeeper 
verified the contractual obligations and prepared the 
checks. Magee stole the checks. The New Jersey court 
there rejected 3-405's application on the ground that 
"the payees were bona fide creditors of the company who 
had respectively submitted their invoices for work per­
formed or materials furnished. 11 
One retionale for the distinction between the two 
cases is that in Snua Harbor reasonably appropriate account-
•I . ,  .i 
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ing, auditing and bookkeeping measures still might not 
have prevented the fraud, for a careful check would have 
disclosed that the accounts were in fact owed. In the 
broker's case an audit or cross check made at the time 
the checks were drawn would have disclosed that the cus­
tomers had not ordered the securities sales and were not 
entitled to the money. It is not clear how one arrives at 
the Snug Harbor conclusion under the language of 3-405(1) 
(c) • Perhaps he can say in that case the agent did not 
11supply 11 the name, rather that the name was in fact sup-· 
plied by the creditor himself. 
· 
3. supplied? Both Snug Harbor and Neufeld also 
present the question when has the employee "supplied 
• • • the name of the payee intending the latter to 
have no such interest"? Comment 4 to 3-405 points out 
that: 
The provision applies only to the agent 
or employee of the drawer, and only to the 
agent or employee who supplies him with the 
name of the payee. 
The section is not meant to cover the messenger who simply 
steals the check and forges an indorsement. Is there some 
line that distinguishes those who do supply names (payroll 
clerks) and those who do not (messenger) ? In the Neufeld 
case the third circuit responded to that question with 
respect to the stockbroker who submitted fictitious sell 
orders as follows: 
For the purpose of giving meaning to the word 
" supplied 1  in Section 3-405 (1) (c) , we can find 
no reasonable place to draw the line within the 
business enterprise of the drawer. Accordingly, 
in the context of the facts here, the only 
rational distinction lies between the bona fide 
and fraudulent transactions because it is only 
in the case of a bona fide transaction that any­
one other than the faithless employee can be 
said to have supplied the name of the payee to 
the company. When Wexler, by submitting the 
fraudulent sell order to the trading room at 
Smith, initiated normal business practice to 
produce a check payable to a named payee, and 
Wexler intended the payee to have no interest 
in the proceeds of the chec.1<, he 11supplied11 
Smith with the name of the payee thereby making 
his forged indorsement effective as between Smith 
and the drawee Bank. 
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II. Defenses and Miscellaneous Issues 
A. Negligence. Since 3-40 5 is truly but a presumption of 
negligence on the part of the·drawer, one can argue by analogy 
to 3-406 and 4-406 that if the depositary or drawee bank are 
themselves negligent, their negl igence s�ould bar them from 
use of 3-40 5; the signature should be regarded as ineffective, 
as a forgery. That would be the outcome under a routine appli ­
cation of the negl igence principles of 3-406 where the customer ' s  
negligence does not operate against the bank if the bank itself 
fails to use "reasonable commercial standards. " In Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America v. Marine National Exchange Bank of 
Milwaukee, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 462 (E. D. Wis. 1974) Prudential 
issued a $20,000 check payable to a policyholder. A Prudential 
employee had suppl ied the policy owner ' s  name intending that 
she have no interest in the instrument. Will iamson, the 
Prudential agent, forged the payee's name on the check and so 
transferred it to his bookie, Mr. Plotkin. The bank ultimately 
paid the $20, 000 check to the bookie. The bank then argued 
that the indorsement was effective because of 3-40 5 (1) (c). 
Prudential responded that the cashing of a $20,000 check for 
a bookie under such circumstances was not the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards and thus that the bank should 
be denied the use of 3-40 5 and be required to recredit its 
account. In rejecting Prudential's argument the court pointed 
out first that Prudential was not arguing bad fai th or that 
the depositary bank was not a holder in due course. It 
observed that 3-405 "flatly states that • • •  the loss should 
fall upon the employer of an unfaithful employee; no qual ifi ­
cations for the negligence of the payer bank is indicated. 11 
In an analogous case on slightly different grounds the 
., Tennessee Supreme Court came to a different conclusion, 
Mcconnico v. Third National Bank of Nashville, 499 S. W. 2d 
874, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 6 41 (Tenn. 1973) . In that case Mr. 
Hardison devised a variety of ways to get money out of his 
corporation and into his own hands. Ultimately the trustee 
in bankruptcy of the corporation challenged some of these 
transfers. One such transfer was a corporate check payable 
to the order of the "Clear Creek Coal Co. 1  drawn by Hardison. 
Hardison forged the indorsement of the coal company and 
deposited the check in his own account. The bank's teller's 
manual specified that checks payable to corporations could not 
be cashed and had to be deposi ted to the account of the payee. 
The court found that the defendant bank received notice from 
the face of the instrument that t.."le transactions "were highly 
�. irregular. ,. The court held that such notice precluded the bank 
from becoming a holder in due course and found them to be liable 
on the check despite 3-405. The court fails to note that sec­




















simply that indorsements which comply with 3-405 are 11effective. ". 
Presumably such indorsements would be as effective for non­
holders in due course as for holders in due course. Therefore 
it is unclear why notice and non-holder-in-due-course status 
produce a contrary result in the Tennessee case unless that 
court is really concluding that one who is negligent is not 
entitled to the protection of 3-405. 
B. Note that if the forger is not careful to sign the 
exact name of the fictitious payee , section 3-405 may not apply. 
See Travco Corp. v. Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of 
Port Huron , 42 Mich. App. 291 , 201 N. W. 2d 675 , 11 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 779 (Mich. Ct. of App. 1972). That literal reading of 
the indorsement rules i l lustrates the same thing as the 
Ten.�essee case , namely, courts will grasp for a way to deprive 
the depositary or payer banks of the protection of 3-405 in 
circumstances in which the courts regard the banks as negl igent. 
C. Dual forgery. In Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. 
Hampton State Bank , 497 S.W. 2d 80 , 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 876 
(Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1973) , a thief forged the signature of 
Mr. F.J. Spillman, president of Pizza Inn, Inc. and made the 
check payable to a fictitious organization "Pizza Inn, Inc. 
No. 32." The thief then opened an account at Hampton State 
Bank in the name of Pizza Inn, Inc� No. 32 , deposited the 
$4 , 000 check and ultimately withdrew most of that sum. 
Northwest National Bank made final payment on the check. 
Subsequently Hampton asked Northwest to return the chec� 
and made a claim aaainst its bonding company. The appellate 
court held that the bonding company did not owe Hampton any­
thing because the underlying transaction had not caused 
Hampton any loss "through forgery. " The court found that 
the indorsement was effective because the thief signed "as 
or on behalf of" the drawer (3-405). Thus the warranty of 
good title was not breached and the loss should have rested 
on the payer under the doctrine of Price v. Neal. (Note 
the court might have reached the same conclusion by conclud­
ing , under 3-401 (2), that the indorsement was effective under 
an assumed name selected by the thief.) 
